Attribute-based encryption (ABE) is used for achieving data confidentiality and access control in cloud environments. Most often ABE schemes are constructed using bilinear pairing which has a higher computational complexity, making algorithms inefficient to some extent. The motivation of this paper is on achieving user privacy during the interaction with attribute authorities by improving the efficiency of ABE schemes in terms of computational complexity. As a result the aim of this paper is two-fold; firstly, to propose an efficient Tate pairing algorithm based on multi-base number representation system using point halving (TP-MBNR-PH) with bases 1/2, 3, and 5 to reduce the cost of bilinear pairing operations and, secondly, the TP-MBNR-PH algorithm is applied in decentralized KP-ABE to compare its computational costs for encryption and decryption with existing schemes.
Introduction
Cloud computing, as an emerging computing paradigm, empowers client to remotely store information on a cloud in order to access services on request. Over the past few years, it has been observed that cloud computing has become a full-fledged promising business idea for the IT sector. As data related to people and organizations resides in the cloud, to a large extent, a concern for security is addressed. This issue reduces the potentiality of cloud computing technologies in terms of giving protection and assurance to the end user information and, at the same time, it plaguies the market. In order to secure information from being disclosed, clients need to encipher their information before it is shared. Access control is elementary, as it is the primary line of defense that avoids unauthorized access to the shared information. In considering the above facts, attribute-based encryption (ABE) is given much more attention in providing information security and in comprehending fine-grained, one-to-numerous, and non-interactive access control. Thus it is evident that ABE supports both confidentiality and access control with a single encryption for data sharing in a cloud environment.
In 2005, Sahai and Waters [1] proposed another sort of IBE scheme called fuzzy IBE (FIBE) which compliments identities as a collection of descriptive attributes. FIBE is viewed as the primary idea of ABE in which the information owner encrypts a message to all users having a specific collection of attributes. In the same period, Nali et al. [2] also proposed a threshold-based ABE technique to convey the fact that this technique forestalls the collusion attacks and opens a new weakness in which threshold semantics are restricted in planning broader frameworks that require expressive access control. Data user, data owner, attribute authority (AA), and cloud storage server are the four kinds of parties involved in ABE. In the ABE scheme, attributes are assumed to be the critical part. Attributes
Paper Organization
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: Section 2 covers the related work. Section 3 deals with the proposed work of this paper. It consists of two subsections: firstly, Section 3.1 describes the proposed work of an efficient Tate pairing algorithm based on a multi-base number representation system using point halving (TP-MBNR-PH) with bases 1/2, 3, and 5; secondly, Section 3.2 describes the applicability of the TP-MBNR-PH algorithm in decentralized KP-ABE. Section 4 concludes the paper.
Related Work
There are two fundamental sorts of ABE, particularly cipher text-policy ABE (CP-ABE) and key-policy ABE (KP-ABE). The ABE scheme is categorized into two: single-authority ABE (SA-ABE) and multi-authority ABE (MA-ABE). In the MA-ABE scheme, there are two sub-categories; with a central authority (CA) and without a central authority. Chase introduced an MA-ABE scheme [14] utilizing a trusted CA for disbursing all the keys. The main drawback of utilizing a CA is that it increases the computation and communication cost. Lin et al. [15] resolved the secure threshold multi-authority fuzzy identity based encryption (threshold MA-FIBE) scheme in the absence of a central authority.
In the same lines, Chase and Chow in [11] introduced an MA-ABE scheme removing the CA using distributed pseudorandom functions. In this scheme, every pair of AAs firmly exchange a shared secret among them in the setup process. Users must submit their global identities (GIDs) to every AA to get the decryption credentials in [14] . This cleaves the user protection since a collection of perverted AAs can pool together each of the attributes that belong to the specific GID.
In [11] , Chase and Chow introduced an anonymous key-issuing protocol to mitigate the privacy vulnerability in which a user can acquire the decryption keys from AAs without exposing his/her GID. Despite the fact that the scheme introduced by Chase and Chow avoids the central AA, all the AAs must be online and collude with each other to set up the ABE system. Thus, it is not fully decentralized. Furthermore, different protocols are proposed to decentralize the ABE scheme [11, 14, 16, 17] ; nonetheless, each scheme has its own benefits and bad marks.
The first known completely decentralized MA-ABE scheme is suggested in [16] where any party can turn into an AA and there is no prerequisite for any global co-ordination other than the production of a pioneer collection of common reference parameters. This overcomes the collusion vulnerability without providing co-ordination between AAs with novel strategies to tie key parts together and anticipate collusion attacks between users with various global identifiers. This scheme does not protect the user privacy as attributes of users are gathered by AAs following users' GIDs. The scheme in [11] considers privacy, however, it is not completely decentralized. Han et al. suggested a PP decentralized scheme for KP-ABE in [18] for preserving the user privacy based on the decisional bilinear Diffie-Hellman (DBDH) standard complexity assumption. In [18] , the GID of the user is utilized to tie all the decryption keys together, where blind key generation protocol has been used to issue the decryption keys. Subsequently, perverted AAs cannot pool the users' attributes by following the GIDs' of the users from the decryption keys. Unluckily, the scheme cannot counteract user collusion, thus, two users can pool their decryption keys to produce decryption keys for an unauthorized user [19] . This is because of weak binding between users' GID and the decryption keys.
Rahulamathavan et al. [12] constructed the privacy-preserving decentralized KP-ABE scheme in a cloud environment. It protects the users' privacy when they communicate with multiple authorities to obtain decryption credentials. It reduces the user collusion vulnerability found in [19] and used an anonymous key-issuing protocol based on anonymous credentials. Thus, it cannot generate decryption credentials for malicious users even if two or more users collude their keys. It is both leak-free and selective-failure blind. This scheme is verified using decisional bilinear Diffie-Hellman standard complexity assumption. Yang et al. [13] proposed a scheme to improve privacy and security in decentralizing multi-authority attribute-based encryption in cloud computing. Most often existing ABE schemes are constructed from bilinear pairings. This makes an algorithm inefficient due to its high computational complexity of bilinear pairing. In this paper, first, an efficient Tate pairing based on multi-base number representation system using point halving (TP-MBNR-PH) with point halving, tripling, and quintupling is proposed and then applied in decentralized KP-ABE [12] to determine its computational costs of encryption and decryption.
Proposed Work
The proposed work consists of two parts. Firstly, we propose an efficient Tate pairing algorithm based on multi-base number representation system using point halving (TP-MBNR-PH) with bases 1/2, 3, and 5 with the aim to reduce the cost of bilinear pairing operations. Secondly, the TP-MBNR-PH algorithm is applied in decentralized KP-ABE to determine its computational costs for encryption and decryption.
Proposed Tate Pairing Algorithm Construction

Bilinear Maps
Let G 1 , G 2 , and G T be three cyclic groups of prime order q. G 1 and G 2 are a source group and G T is a target group. Let g 1 and g 2 be generators of G 1 and G 2 , respectively. A bilinear map e is defined as e : G 1 × G 2 → G T which has the following properties:
• Bilinearity: e(g a 1 , g b 2 ) = e(g 1 , g 2 ) ab , where a, b ∈ Z.
• Computability: The bilinear map e is efficiently computable by G 1 × G 2 for any pairs.
• Non-degeneracy: e(g 1 , g 2 ) = 1. This means all pairs of the source group do not map to the identity of the target group.
Note: If G 1 = G 2 , then it is a symmetric map, otherwise it is an asymmetric map.
Point Halving (PH)
Fundamentally all the scalar multiplication is ascertained by utilizing the double and add method. However, Knuden (1999) and Schroeppel (2000) , in parallel, proposed a strategy to speed up scalar multiplication on elliptic curves characterized over binary augmentation fields. Their technique depends on a novel elliptic curve primitive called point halving, which can be characterized as follows: Given a point Q of odd order, compute P such that Q = 2P. The point P is denoted as 1/2 Q. That means, in this technique the previous double and add method is replaced by the half and add method, which is the exact inverse operation of point doubling. The strategies replaced all point doublings in the double-and-add algorithm with another operation called point halving. This technique is executed for conducting scalar multiplication on non-super singular elliptic curves in Cryptography 2018, 2, 14 5 of 15 characteristic 2. Point halving is applied to the curves with minimal two-torsion. Since, hypothetically, point halving is up toward three times as quick as point doubling, it is conceivable to enhance the execution of scalar multiplication calculation Q = nP by supplanting the double-and-add algorithm.
Let P = (x, y) be a point on the elliptic curve defined over binary field using affine coordinates. A point doubling requires calculating the coordinates of the point Q = 2P = (u, v) using the following equations:
Point halving is just the opposite, i.e., given Q = (u, v), find P = (x, y) such that Q = 2P. This is computed by solving Equation (2) for λ, Equation (3) for x, and finally, Equation (1) for y. This means that we have to solve λ 2 + λ = u + a, for λ, v = x 2 + u (λ + 1) for x, and finally obtain y = λ x + x 2 . A detailed analysis of the computational complexity of point halving was made in [20] . It was reported that the point halving method is 15% to 24% faster than point doubling.
3.1.3. The Double-Base Number System (DBNS)
In [21] , a ternary/binary methodology was proposed for fast Elliptic Curve Cryptography. An equivalent tactic was suggested in [22] where an integer k is represented in the double-base number system. The following definitions are needed [23] :
Definition 1 (S-integer). Given a set of primes S, an S-integer is a positive integer whose prime factors all belong to S. Definition 2 (double-base number system). Given p, q, two relatively prime positive integers, the double-base number system (DBNS) is a representation scheme into which every positive integer n is represented as the sum or difference of {p, q}-integers, i.e., numbers of the form p a q b : n = ∑ m i=1 s i p b i q t i , with s i ∈ {−1, 1}, and b i , t i ≥ 0.
If the sequences of binary and ternary exponents decrease monotonically, i.e.,
Take the example of 314,159 as used in [24] . Its double-base chain representation is: Let k be an integer and let B = {b 1 , . . . , b l } be a set of "small" integers. A representation of k as a sum of powers of elements of B is called a multi-base representation [25] of n using the base B. The base set size of the double-base representation, i.e., |B| = 2, and that of multi-base representation is greater than two, i.e., |B| > 2.
Definition: A multiple representation l = ∑ m i=1 s i 2 b i 3 t i 5 r i using the bases {2, 3, 5} is called a step multi-base number representation, where each exponent {b i }, {t i }, and {r i } refes to separate monotonic decreasing sequences.
The MBNR is compared to DBNS, which is shorter in length and more redundant. For example, in Table 1, 200 has 3027 DBNS representation (base 2 and 3) , 316,557 representations using the bases 2, 3 and 5 and has 4,827,147 representations using the bases 2, 3, 5, and 7. N  B = {2, 3}  B = {2, 3, 5}  B = {2, 3, 5, 7}   10  5  8  10  20  12  32  48  50  72  489  1266  100  402  8425  43,777  150  1296  63,446  586,862  200  3027  316, [26] , where each exponent {b i }, {t i } and {r i } refers to separate monotonic decreasing sequences.
Take the example of 314,159 as used in [26] . Its MBNR is represented as:
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Experimental Results
To obtain the results of the proposed TP-MBNR-PH, initially we have to apply the formula for computing the Tate pairing of elliptic curves over finite fields. Integers with at least 160 bit size which are represented with bases 1/2, 3, and 5 are used in Miller's algorithm. Table 2 shows the cost and pre-computed cost for the operations TADD, TSUB, THAL, TTRL, and TQNT in the proposed TP-MBNR-PH. Let TADD, TSUB, THAL, TTRL, and TQNT denote the addition, subtraction, halving, tripling, and quintupling operations, respectively, as shown in Table 2 . Figure 1 and Table 3 shows the number of multiplication operation to compute Tate pairing using different methods. Let I, S and M denote the cost of inversion, squaring and multiplication in F * q respectively as shown in Table 1 . Let I k , S k and M k ≈ k 1.6 M denote the cost of inversion, squaring, and multiplication in F * q k , respectively, as shown in Table 1 . Let M b (≈ kM) denote the cost of multiplication between F * q and F * q k . An embedding degree denoted as k, which takes the values of 4, 6, and 8 [27] . In Table 4 , we significantly improves the proposed TP-MBNR-PH and show the comparison of the proposed TP-MBNR-PH with an existing algorithm. 
Efficiency of the Proposed Algorithm
The total pre-computed cost of the proposed TP-MBNR-PH is:
By taking 4 = 9 , 6 = 18
The total cost of the proposed algorithm is:
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• Global setup (GS) : Take input as a security parameter λ and it generates the bilinear group G 1 and G 2 GS 1 λ → {G 1 , G 2 } with prime order P. Let e : 
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Each A k specifies m k as the minimum number of attributes required to satisfy the access structure (m k < n k ).
• Key Generation (KG) : The attribute set of the user is A u :
A k generates r k,u ∈ randomly Z p and polynomial q x for each node x (including the leaves) T. For each node x, the degree d x of the polynomial q x is d x = k x − 1 where k x is the threshold value of that node. For the root node root, set q root (0) = r k,u . For any other node x, q x (0) = q parent(x) (index(x)). Now decryption key for the user u is generates as follows: (g 1 , g 1 ) 
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Experimental Results
In this section, we show the total computation cost of encryption and decryption for the MA-ABE. The proposed Tate pairing algorithm is discussed in detail in Section 3. The proposed decentralized KP-ABE is constructed with the help of the proposed TP-MBNR-PH and compared with MA-ABE using an existing Tate pairing algorithm. In this experiment, we used an Intel Core i3-3217U CPU processor (Intel, China) with 1.80 GHz and 8 GB RAM. Let us assume the number of attribute authorities, = 2, and say, attribute n varies from 10 to 50. Figure 2 depicts the comparison of total encryption cost of MA-ABE for the proposed scheme and [12, 13] . The time complexity of proposed encryption algorithm increases linearly with respect to the attributes. Figure 2 clearly shows the significant improvement of the proposed encryption algorithm when compared with the existing schemes [12, 13] . Figure 3 depicts the comparison of the total decryption cost of MA-ABE for the proposed scheme and [12, 13] . The time complexity of the proposed decryption algorithm increases linearly with respect to the attributes. Figure 3 clearly shows the significant improvement of the proposed decryption algorithm when compared with the existing schemes [12, 13] . • Decryption (D) : In order to decrypt C, the user u, computes X, Y, and S k as follows:
The user then decrypts the message m as follows:
The N number of AAs are denoted as {A 1 , A 2 , . . . , A N }. Let A k = a k,1 , . . . , a k, n k be the attribute set managed by Attribute Authority (AA), which is denoted as A k . The global setup algorithm takes the security parameter as input for generating bilinear group order G 1 and G 2 . Each AA execute the AAs algorithm to randomly generate the public keys and the corresponding secret keys. The public-secret key pair for A k is given as {SK k = Figure 1 . Comparison of number of multiplication operations based on the embedding degree.
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Applying the Proposed TP-MBNR-PH in a Decentralized KP-ABE Scheme
The TP-MBNR-PH algorithm is applied in a decentralized KP-ABE [12] . The detailed steps are as follows: as:
Experimental Results
In this section, we show the total computation cost of encryption and decryp ABE. The proposed Tate pairing algorithm is discussed in detail in Section 3 decentralized KP-ABE is constructed with the help of the proposed TP-MBNR-PH with MA-ABE using an existing Tate pairing algorithm. In this experiment, we used 3217U CPU processor (Intel, China) with 1.80 GHz and 8 GB RAM. Let us assum attribute authorities, = 2, and say, attribute n varies from 10 to 50. Figure 2 clearly shows the significant improvement of t algorithm when compared with the existing schemes [12, 13] . Figure 3 depi total decryption cost of MA-ABE for the proposed scheme and [12, 13] . Th k, n k , ∀ k}. The key-generation algorithm issues the decryption keys to user u with a set of attributes, A u . The output of the algorithm is a decryption key which permits the user to decrypt a message which is encrypted under a set of attributes A k u which is based on the threshold policy, which relays on the tree-based access structure.
In the encryption algorithm, let A m denotes the attribute set which is used to encrypt message m, A k m denotes the set of common attributes between message m and the AA, i.e., A m = A 1 m , . . . , A k m , . . . , A N m . Additionally, let I C denote the set of index of attribute authorities AAs involved in the ciphertext of message m. To encrypt the message m, the message owner has to generate s randomly and also he hast to calculate the cipher text C; C = C 1 , C 2 , C 3 , C k,j , ∀a k,j ∈ A k m . To decrypt the message m, the user should have access to the decryption keys for the attributes. By executing the decryption algorithm, by following the four steps he can obtain the message m from the ciphertext as follows: (1) Initially the user has to compute X using C 2 and DK k,u . (2) and polynomial interpolation to obtain r k,u . (4) Finally, the user can obtain the message m using C 1 and pre-computed values X, Y and S k , ∀k.
Anonymous Key-Issuing Protocol
In order to avoid user collusions, we have used anonymous key-issuing protocol which is based on anonymous credential system which, in turn, allows users to access decryption keys from the AAs without enlightening their GIDs. The user U and the attribute authority A k jointly construct the key-issuing protocol, which consists of the following steps:
•
The two-party protocol (2PC) is used for the interaction between the user u and the attribute authority A k . The 2PC protocol takes u, H 1 and H 2 from user r k,u , ρ k from A k and return x = (u + ρ k )H 1 mod p and y = (u + r k,u )H 2 mod p to A k .
• Once the 2PC protocol gets executed, the user u now computes P = g
and then sends to A k .
•
and proof of knowledge with the help of P, Q, R, x, and y and send them to the user: 
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It is executed by each AA to randomly generate the Security parameter ( ) of authority and public parameter ( ) of authority :
Each A specifies m as the minimum number of attributes required to satisfy the access structure (m < n ).
The attribute set of the user is : ∩ = , ∀ . generates , ∈ ℤ and polynomial for each node (including the leaves) . For each node , the degree of the polynomial is = − 1 where is the threshold value of that 
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User u exponentiates the received values by H 1 H 2 to get the decryption keys.
The key advantage of the proposed key issuing protocol is both leak f ree and selective − f ailure blind. Suppose for the message m, the attribute set is A m = {a 1 , a 2 }. If the users U 1 and U 2 with identifiers u 1 and u 2 respectively have access to decryption credential for attribute {a 1 }, while another user U 3 with identifier u 3 has access to attribute {a 2 } alone; none of the users can decrypt the ciphertext alone. However, there is a possibility that users can collude together so that they can generate the decryption credentials to decrypt the cipher text. This algorithm overcomes the user collusion vulnerability since u 1 and u 2 cannot be substituted with u 3 without the knowledge of ρ 1 , r 1,u 1 , and r 1,u 2 .
Proposed Scheme: Proof of Security
Decisional Bilinear Diffie-Hellman (DBDH) assumption: Let a, b, c, z ∈ Z p be chosen at random, G be the group of prime order q and g is the generator of the group G. The DBDH problem [30] is a problem that no polynomial time adversary is able to distinguish the tuple (g a , g b , g c , e(g, g) abc )
from the tuple (g a , g b , g c , e(g, g) z ) with a non-negligible advantage. This can be formalized as follows:
Under Decisional Bilinear Diffie-Hellman (DBDH) assumptions, no polynomial time attacker can selectively break the proposed system.
Proof. The security game is based on the hardness of the DBDH assumption. Suppose attacker atk can win the FH-CP-ABE game with advantage ε. We construct a simulator sim that can distinguish a DBDH tuple from a random tuple with advantage ε 2 . Let G 1 be the source group and G 2 be the target group. Let g be the generator of the group G 1 . The challenger chooses the fair binary coin
Anonymous Key-Issuing Protocol
In order to avoid user collusions, we have used anonymous key-issuing protocol which is based on anonymous credential system which, in turn, allows users to access decryption keys from the AAs without enlightening their GIDs. The user and the attribute authority jointly construct the keyissuing protocol, which consists of the following steps:
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Proposed Scheme: Proof of Security
Decisional Bilinear Diffie-Hellman (DBDH) assumption: Let , , , ∈ ℤ be chosen at random, be the group of prime order and is the generator of the group . The DBDH problem [30] is a problem that no polynomial time adversary is able to distinguish the tuple ( , , , ( , ) ) from the tuple ( , , , ( , ) ) with a non-negligible advantage. This can be formalized as follows: Proof. The security game is based on the hardness of the DBDH assumption. Suppose attacker can win the FH-CP-ABE game with advantage . We construct a simulator that can distinguish a DBDH tuple from a random tuple with advantage . Let be the source group and be the target group. Let be the generator of the group . The challenger chooses the fair binary coin ɦ ∈ {0,1}, ∈ , ∈ and , , ∈ ℤ . If ɦ = 0, then the challenger defines to be ( , ) . Otherwise, he sets = ( , )
. The challenger then gives the simulator the DBDH details and then simulator now plays the role of challenger in the security game.
: During the init phase, receives the challenge access structure * from attacker .
∈ {0, 1}, g ∈ G 1 , R ∈ G 2 and a, b, c ∈ Z p . If = 0, then the challenger defines T to be e(g, g) abc . Otherwise, he sets T = e(g, g) z or R. The challenger then gives the simulator the DBDH details and then simulator sim now plays the role of challenger in the security game.
Init: During the init phase, sim receives the challenge access structure A * from attacker atk.
Setup:
To provide a public key PK to atk, sim randomly chooses as follows:
Take input as a security parameter and it generates the bilinear gro (1 ) → { , } with prime order . Let e: × → be the bilinear m and , , are generators of the group . The number of authorities are denoted { , , … , }: monitor attributes i.e., = , , … , , , ∀ . -MBNR-PH algorithm is applied in a decentralized KP-ABE [12] . The detailed steps are ( ): Take input as a security parameter and it generates the bilinear group (1 ) → { , } with prime order . specifies m as the minimum number of attributes required to satisfy the access re (m < n ).
( ):
The attribute set of the user is : ∩ = , ∀ . generates ℤ and polynomial for each node (including the leaves) . For each node egree of the polynomial is = − 1 where is the threshold value of that k as: e(g, g)
The TP-MBNR-PH algorithm is applied in a decentralized KP-ABE [12] . The detailed steps are as follows:  ( ): Take input as a security parameter and it generates the bilinear group (1 ) → { , } with prime order . ℤ and polynomial for each node (including the leaves) . For each node , the degree of the polynomial is = − 1 where is the threshold value of that k = e(g, g)
The TP-MBNR-PH algorithm is applied in a decentralized KP-ABE [12] . The detailed steps are as follows:  ( ): Take input as a security parameter and it generates the bilinear group (1 ) → { , } with prime order . Simulator sim chooses r k,u ∈ randomly Z p . It can be obtained as follows: DK k,u = g −
Applying the Proposed TP-MBNR-PH in a Decentralized KP-ABE Scheme
The TP-MBNR-PH algorithm is applied in a decentralized KP-ABE [12] . 
Experimental Results
In this section, we show the total computation cost of encryption and decryption for the MA-ABE. The proposed Tate pairing algorithm is discussed in detail in Section 3. The proposed decentralized KP-ABE is constructed with the help of the proposed TP-MBNR-PH and compared with MA-ABE using an existing Tate pairing algorithm. In this experiment, we used an Intel Core i3-3217U CPU processor (Intel, China) with 1.80 GHz and 8 GB RAM. Let us assume the number of attribute authorities, = 2, and say, attribute n varies from 10 to 50. Figure 2 depicts the comparison of total encryption cost of MA-ABE for the proposed scheme and [12, 13] . The time complexity of proposed encryption algorithm increases linearly with respect to the attributes. Figure 2 clearly shows the significant improvement of the proposed encryption algorithm when compared with the existing schemes [12, 13] . Figure 3 depicts the comparison of the total decryption cost of MA-ABE for the proposed scheme and [12, 13] . The time complexity of the proposed decryption algorithm increases linearly with respect to the attributes. Figure 3 clearly shows the significant improvement of the proposed decryption algorithm when compared with the existing schemes [12, 13] . k,j ∈ randomly Z p . It computes the rest of the secret key as follows:
Cryptography 2018, 3, x FOR PEER REVIEW 12 of 15
: To provide a public key to , randomly chooses ϰ ∈ ℤ and note ϰ = ϰ + . It calculates ( , ) as: ( , ) = ( , ) . ( , ) . Finally, sends public key to .
: During this phase, submits an attribute set 
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Challenge:
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e, receives the challenge access structure * from attacker .
∈ {0, 1} and computes CT * as C 1 = mˆ , , and , .
Proposed Scheme: Proof of Security
Decisional Bilinear Diffie-Hellman (DBDH) assumption: Let , , , ∈ ℤ be chosen at random, be the group of prime order and is the generator of the group . The DBDH problem [30] is a problem that no polynomial time adversary is able to distinguish the tuple ( , , , ( , ) ) from the tuple ( , , , ( , ) ) with a non-negligible advantage. This can be formalized as follows:
Pr[ ( , , , , ( , ) ) = 0] − Pr g, g , g , g , e(g, g) = 0 ≥ Theorem 1. Under Decisional Bilinear Diffie-Hellman (DBDH) assumptions, no polynomial time attacker can selectively break the proposed system.
Proof. The security game is based on the hardness of the DBDH assumption. Suppose attacker can win the FH-CP-ABE game with advantage . We construct a simulator that can distinguish a DBDH tuple from a random tuple with advantage . Let be the source group and be the target group. Let be the generator of the group . The challenger chooses the fair binary coin ɦ ∈ {0,1}, ∈ , ∈ and , , ∈ ℤ . If ɦ = 0, then the challenger defines to be ( , ) . Otherwise, he sets = ( , )
Y∏ k∈I C S k X . Finally, sim sends the CT * to atk.
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, simulator sim guesses that T = e(g, g) abc .
Otherwise, T is a random target group element in G 2 .
The advantage of the attacker is ε, when T = e(g, g) abc . The advantage of the attacker is 1 2 , when T is a random target group element in G 2 . Finally, the advantage of the simulator in this security game is ε 2 .
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